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We present the quantum measurement problem as a serious physics problem. Serious because
without a resolution, quantum theory is not complete, as it does not tell how one should - in principle
- perform measurements. It is physical in the sense that the solution will bring new physics, i.e.
new testable predictions; hence it is not merely a matter of interpretation of a frozen formalism. I
argue that the two popular ways around the measurement problem, many-worlds and Bohmian-like
mechanics, do, de facto, introduce effective collapses when “I” interact with the quantum system.
Hence, surprisingly, in many-worlds and Bohmian mechanics, the “I” plays a more active role than
in alternative models, like e.g. collapse models. Finally, I argue that either there are several kinds of
stuffs out there, i.e. physical dualism, some stuff that respects the superposition principle and some
that doesn’t, or there are special configurations of atoms and photons for which the superposition
principle breaks down. Or, and this I argue is the most promising, the dynamics has to be modified,
i.e. in the form of a stochastic Schro¨dinger equation.
I. THE QUANTUM MEASUREMENT
PROBLEM
Quantum theory is undoubtedly an extraordinarily
successful physics theory. It is also incredibly fascinating:
somehow, by ”brute mental force”, one can understand
the strange and marvelous world of atoms and photons!
Furthermore, it is amazingly consistent, in the sense that
it is amazingly difficult to modify the formalism: appar-
ently, any change here or there activates non-locality, i.e.
allows one to exploit quantum entanglement for arbitrary
fast communication [1–3]. How could the fathers develop
such a consistent theory based on the very sparse exper-
imental evidence they had? In the landscape of theories,
whatever that means, quantum theory must be quite iso-
lated, so that if one looks for a theory in the neighbor-
hood, one has to meet it. However, the quantum formal-
ism is not consistent if one demands that a physics theory
tells how one should, in principle, make measurements,
as we develop in this article; it is also not consistent if
one treats the observer as a quantum system [4].
Quantum theory is a physics theory and all physics the-
ory should tell what is measurable and how to perform
measurements. About the first of these two points, quan-
tum theory tells that all self-adjoint operators correspond
to a measurable quantity. More precisely and probably
more correct (it depends on the textbooks), quantum the-
ory claims that every physical quantity is represented by
a self-adjoint operator and every physical quantity can be
measured (almost by definition of a physical quantity).
Note that often these measurable physical quantities are
called observables. So far so good. But let’s turn to
the second point above: how to perform measurements.
Here quantum theory is surprisingly silent. Often it is
said that one should couple the system under investi-
gation to a measurement apparatus, frequently called a
pointer, and then measure the latter [5] (for a recent ap-
plication of this, related to the measurement problem,
see [6]). Hence, to measure a physical quantity of inter-
est of your quantum system, you should measure another
system. This is the infamous shifty split, as the pointer
itself should be measured by coupling it to yet another
measurement system, and so on.
If one insists, the theory remains silent. But the de-
fender of the theory get virulent: “If you don’t know
how to perform measurements”, they claim, “then you
are not a good physicist!”. Ok, physicists do know how
to perform measurements, indeed, especially experimen-
tal physicists. But shouldn’t all physics theories tell how
to perform measurements, at least in principle?
Somehow, quantum theory is incomplete. I belong to
the generation that learned that one should never write
such a claim in a paper, at least if one wants to pub-
lish it in a respectable journal1. Admittedly, one has to
be careful with such incompleteness claims. The idea is
clearly not to go back to classical physics, i.e. to a mech-
anistic theory in which cogwheels and billiard balls push
other cogwheels and billiard balls. The idea is also not to
complement quantum theory with local elements of real-
ity, using EPR’s terminology [8], nor with local beables
in Bell’s terminology [9]. The idea is simply to comple-
ment quantum theory is such a way that it tells how, in
principle, one performs measurements.
To illustrate the kind of complements I am looking
for, one could, for example, postulate that the world is
made out of two sorts of stuff, one to which the quantum
mechanical superposition principle2 applies and one to
which it doesn’t apply. Quantum theory would describe
only the first kind of stuff and measurements happen
when one couples (somehow) the two sorts of stuffs. The
readers will have recognized standard Copenhagen inter-
pretation of quantum theory: the theory applies only
to the “small stuff”, while the superposition principle
doesn’t apply to the “large stuff”. Measurements hap-
pen when one couples a small quantum system to a large
1 or on the arxiv [7]?
2 The superposition principle states, in words, that if some stuff
can be either in one state or in another, it can also be in the
first state and in the second one, i.e. in superposition of the two
states.
2measurement apparatus. As sketched here, this dualistic
idea, i.e. that there are two kinds of stuffs, is not yet
a complete theory. First, because it doesn’t tell how to
recognize the two sorts of stuffs (besides that the super-
position principle applies to one and not to the other).
Second, because it doesn’t tell how to couple these two
kinds of stuffs. Moreover, one may argue that a com-
plete theory should also describe the other - non quan-
tum - kind of stuff. Nevertheless, I believe that this line
of thought deserves to be investigated more in depth, see
section VI.
What are the alternatives to some sort of dualism?
Assume there is only one sort of stuff, but certain
arrangements of this stuff make it special. For example,
assume everything is made out of elementary particles,
but certain arrangements of atoms and photons make
them act as measuring apparatuses3. Hence the question:
Which configurations of atoms and photons charac-
terize measurement setups?
Looking for such special configurations is an interest-
ing line of research. Thanks to the world-wide develop-
ment in quantum technologies, we should soon be able
to investigate highly complex configurations of (natural
or artificial) atoms and (optical or micro-wave) photons.
Shall these developments lead to a breakthrough in quan-
tum physics? Possibly, though most physicists bet on the
contrary, i.e. bet that arbitrarily complex quantum pro-
cessors will be developed, showing no sign of “collapses”,
no sign of any breakdown of the superposition principle.
II. WHAT IS PHYSICS
Quantum theory explains very well why it is more and
more difficult to keep coherence when the complexity
increases: because of the so-called decoherence phenom-
ena. So, are we facing the end of “clean physics”? Shall
we have to stay with the fact that, apparently, quantum
theory holds at all scales, i.e. the superposition principle
is truly universal, but for all practical purposes (FAPP,
as Bell would have said [10]) there is a sort of complexity
law of Nature - a sort of 2nd law - that states that
it is ultimately harder and harder to demonstrate the
superposition principle experimentally for larger and
more complex systems? Who knows. But for sure, we -
the physics community - should not give up the grand
enterprise that easily4. Recall that
3 Note that this would imply that the property of acting like a
measurement apparatus is an emergent property. Moreover, once
this emergent property obtains, the proper arrangement of atoms
would gain the capacity of top-down causality, as such arrange-
ments of atoms would have the power to collapse superpositions.
4 In [10] John S. Bell wrote: “In the beginning natural philoso-
phers tried to understand the world around them. Trying to do
Physics is all about extracting information
about How Nature Does It.
And for physicists extracting information means per-
forming measurements. Hence the measurement problem
has to be taken seriously.
Let me stress that I consider the quantum measure-
ment problem as a serious and real physics problem. It
is serious because without a solution quantum theory is
incomplete, as discussed above. It is real in the sense
that it’s solution will provide new physics, with new and
testable predictions. Hence it is not merely a matter of
interpretation of a given formalism: to solve it, one has
to go beyond today’s physics.
To conclude this section and to be transparent, I
should state that I am a naive realist (as most physi-
cists): there is a world out there and the grand enter-
prise of Physics aims at understanding it, see footnote 4.
Additionally, following Schro¨dinger [11], I consider that
“I” am not part of it: my aim is to understand the out-
side world, but I am not including myself in that outside
world. Of course, I am made out of atoms and other stuff
that can and should be studied by physics. But physics
is not about explaining my presence. As much as possi-
ble (and I believe it is entirely possible), physics theories
should not postulate that “I” have to exist for the world
to function. This may seem too philosophical, but we
shall see that it has consequences for possible solutions
to the measurement problem. Let me stress that this is
not dualism in a physics sense: the world out there could
well be made out of a single kind of stuff.
In summary, I believe that the scientific method will
never explain why there is something rather than noth-
ing, nor will it explain why “I” am here. Physics must
assume both that “I” exist and that there is a world out
there, so that “I” can gain better and better understand-
ing of the outside world, i.e. of How Nature Does It.
Let’s return to the quantum measurement problem and
look for alternatives to what we already discussed, i.e.
physical dualism (the assumption that there are more
than one sort of stuffs out there), to the existence of
“special” configurations of atoms and photons that make
them act like measurement devices, and to the end of
clean physics5.
that they hit upon the great idea of contriving artificially simple
situations in which the number of factors involved is reduced to a
minimum. Divide and conquer. Experimental science was born.
But experiment is a tool. The aim remain: to understand the
world. To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about
piddling laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise.
A serious formulation will not exclude the big world outside the
laboratory.”
5 In order to avoid receiving a km-long e-mail from Chris Fuchs, let
me say a few words about QBism [12]. QBism changes the goal
of physics. It is no longer about finding out How Nature Does
It, QBism restricts physics to what “I” can say about the future.
3III. MANY-WORLDS
Why not simply assume that quantum theory is com-
plete and the superposition principle universal? This
leads straight to some many-worlds interpretations of
quantum theory [13, 14]. Indeed, since quantum theory is
amazingly successful and since quantum theory without
any addition (i.e. without any vague collapse postulate)
leads to the many-worlds, why not merely adopt a many-
worlds view?
In the many-worlds view, the measurement problem
is circumvented by the claim that everything that has a
chance to happen, whatever tiny chance, does actually
happen. Hence, it is a sort of huge catalog of everything
that could happen. More precisely, it is the catalog of
everything that has happened and of everything that is
happening and of everything that will ever happen. Sim-
ply, we are not aware of the entire catalog, only of that
part of the catalog corresponding to the world in which
“we” happen to live in. But isn’t physics precisely about,
and only about, that part of the catalog? What is the
explanatory power of claiming that everything happens,
but “we” are not aware of everything? And what is that
“we”?
It is a fact that “I” exist. Actually, it is the fact that
I know best. Should “I” be satisfied with a theory that
tells that I exist in a hugely enormous number of copies
and that all the theory provides is a catalog of everything
that “I” or a copy of myself experiences? Not to mention
the vast majority of worlds in which the atoms of my
body don’t make up a human, probably not even a thing.
Actually, the theory says a bit more, it also tells about
correlations. If “I” see this now, then there are only some
events “I” may see in the future. And vice-versa, as time
doesn’t properly exist in the many-worlds. Note that to
achieve this, one conditions the catalog on what “I see
now”, i.e. one uses an effective collapse: one limits the
analysis to that part of the catalog in which “I” see this
now.
In summary, in many-worlds theories, it is “I” that
continuously collapse the state-vector, at least for the
purpose of allowing the theory to make predictions about
what “I” am observing. In other worlds, in many-worlds
the “I” is not merely a passive observer, but plays an
active role.
Admittedly, many-worlds is a logically consistent inter-
pretation, at least as long as one doesn’t insist that “I”
exists. Moreover, it is the most natural one if one sticks
to standard Hilbert-space quantum theory (i.e. without
measurements). But logical consistency is only a neces-
sary condition for a physics theory. Solipsism is another
More precisely, about how “I” should bet on future events. For
me this is not only a betray of the great enterprise, it is almost a
sort of solipsism where everything is about “me” and my believes.
Well, at the end, I am not sure I’ll avoid the km-long e-mail.
example of a logically consistent theory, somehow on the
other extreme to many-worlds: in solipsism only “I” ex-
ists. But, as I stated in the previous section, I am a
realist: I just don’t see how one can do physics without
assuming the “I” and the “world”.
Let me address another issue with many-worlds. It is a
deterministic theory, even a hyper-deterministic theory,
i.e. determinism applies to everything in the entire uni-
verse. Indeed, since there can’t be any influences coming
from outside and since the Schro¨dinger equation - the
only dynamical equation of the theory - is deterministic,
everything that happens today, e.g. what I am writ-
ing, the way each reader reacts, the details of all solar
eruptions, etc, was all encoded in some “quantum fluc-
tuations”6 of the initial state of the universe7. Given the
complexity of the (many-) worlds, it had to be encoded
in some infinitesimal digits of some quantum state, pos-
sibly in the billionths of billionths decimal place. I am
always astonished that some people seriously believe in
that. Mathematical real numbers are undoubtedly very
useful when doing our theory. But are they physically
real [15]8? Do these infinitesimal digits have a real impact
on the real world? Is this still proper physics? For sure,
such assumptions can’t be tested. Hence, for me, hyper-
determinism is a non-sense [15], though it is the domi-
nant trend in today’s high-energy physics and cosmology
(though see [17, 18]). Apparently, the many followers of
today’s trend elevate (unconsciously) the linearity of the
Schro¨dinger equation and the superposition principle to
some sort of ultimate quasi-religious truth, some truth
in which they believes even more than in their own free
will. Note that it is not the first time in science history
that some equations get elevated above reason: follow-
ers of Laplace did also elevate the deterministic Newton
equations to some sort of ultimate truth. We know what
was the destiny of that belief.
In summary, in order to make predictions in the many-
worlds, one introduces some effective collapses that hap-
pen when the system is coupled to “I”. Hence, the theory
is not complete, but relies - somehow - on “I”, i.e. on
some concept foreign to the theory.
IV. BOHMIAN QUANTUM MECHANICS
There is yet another way to avoid the quantum mea-
surement problem. Assume that at all times there is
one and only one “event” that is singled-out9. As time
passes, the list of singled-out events must be consistent,
6 Don’t ask me what that means.
7 or, equivalently, in the final state of the Universe.
8 recall that the assumption that real numbers are physically real
implies that there could be an infinite amounts of information in
a finite volume of space [15, 16].
9 or one collection of events that are singled-out. We may name
this collection as one “big” or “composed” event.
4as in consistent histories [19]. A nice example assumes
that, at the end of the day, everything we ever observe is
the position of some stuff. Hence, let’s assume that the
physical quantity “position” is always well determined by
some additional variable (additional with respect to stan-
dard quantum theory). Interestingly, this can be made
consistent [20, 21], though at the cost of some counter-
intuitive phenomena [22, 23] and assuming it applies to
the entire universe (as soon as one cuts out some piece
of the universe, one may encounter paradoxes [4]).
Note that one may also apply similar ideas to other
physical quantities than position, leading to various
modal interpretations of quantum theory [24, 25]. With
position as the special physical quantity, the reader has
recognized Bohmian quantum mechanics [20, 21]. It is
a nice existence proof of non-local hidden variables that
deserves to be more widely known [26]. It is non-local
despite the fact that the additional variables are points
in space, i.e. highly localised. But the dynamics of these
point-particles is non-local: be acting here one can in-
stantaneously influence the trajectories of point-particles
there, at a distance. At first, this might be considered as
quite odd. But quantum physics is non-local, in the sense
of violating Bell inequalities. Hence, the non-locality of
Bohmian mechanics is quite acceptable. Actually, there
is just no choice: in order to recover the predictions of
quantum theory and the experimental data, all theories
must incorporate the possibility of Bell inequality viola-
tions, i.e. some non-locality.
One ugly aspect, in my opinion, of Bohmian mechan-
ics is that the additional variables must remain hidden
for ever. If not, if one could somehow collect information
about their locations beyond the statistical predictions
of quantum theory, then one could activate non-locality,
i.e. one could use entanglement not only to violate some
Bell inequality, but to send classical information at an
arbitrarily large speed [27]. But can one add variables to
a physics theory while claiming that they are ultimately
not accessible? Bohmians answer that the hidden posi-
tions determine the results of measurements, hence are
not entirely hidden. Indeed, when one observes a result,
one can apply an effective collapse as one knows that the
hidden positions are now distributed within the reduced
wave-function corresponding to quantum statistics. But
there is no way to know more about the location of that
particle10. This raises the question when should one ap-
ply such an effective collapse? The answer presumably
is: “when “I” register a measurement result”, a bit like
in many-worlds.
I find it tempting to compare Bohmian mechanics with
a toy-theory in which one has added as additional vari-
ables all the results of all the measurements that will ever
be performed in the future, though with the restriction
10 Moreover, there are situations in which the hidden particle leaves
a trace where it was not [22, 23].
that none of these additional variables can be accessed
before the corresponding measurements take place. Note
that in such a way one can turn any theory into a deter-
ministic one11. But, for sure, no physicists would take
such a toy-theory seriously. Admittedly, Bohmian me-
chanics is much more elegant than the above sketched
one. But is it fundamentally different?
Let’s return to Bohmian quantum mechanics. As said,
it is a remarkable existence proof of non-local hidden vari-
ables. But does it answer the deep question of the quan-
tum measurement problem? I don’t think so. As with the
many-worlds, it assumes hyper-determinism and relies on
infinitesimal digits for its predictions. Hence, despite the
deterministic equations, it is not a deterministic theory
[15], as I elaborate in the next section. Moreover and
disappointingly, it doesn’t make any new prediction.
Finally, Bohmian mechanics with its non-local hidden
variable is at great tension with relativity.
V. NEWTONIAN DETERMINISM
Some readers may wonder whether I would also have
argued against classical Newtonian mechanics, had I lived
150 years ago. After all, it also relies on deterministic
equations and Newton’s universal gravitation theory is
also non-local; and what about the “I”. Let me start
with the second aspect, non-locality. I have no problem
with quantum non-locality (the possibility to violate Bell
inequalities), because quantum randomness precisely pre-
vents the possibility to use quantum non-locality to send
classical information [28–31]. However, Newton’s non-
locality12 can be used, in principle, to send information
without any physical support carrying this information:
move a rock on the moon (with a small rocket) and mea-
sure the gravitational field on earth. According to New-
ton’s theory this allows one to communicate in a non-
physical way - i.e. without any physical stuff carrying
the information - and at an arbitrarily high speed [32].
This is deeply disturbing and did already disturb Newton
himself [33]:
That Gravity should be innate, inherent and essential
to Matter, so that one Body may act upon another at a
Distance thro a Vacuum, without the mediation of any
thing else, by and through which their Action and Force
may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an
Absurdity, that I believe no Man who has in philosophical
Matters a competent Faculty of thinking, can ever fall
into it.
Admittedly, when I first learned about Newton’s uni-
versal gravitation theory at high school I found it beauti-
11 Note though, that with the sketched construction, time is neces-
sarily build into the toy-theory.
12 which, by the way, predicts the possibility to violate Bell’s in-
equality.
5ful, not noticing how absurd it is. May I suggest that one
should always teach Newton together with the comment
that it is efficient but absurd? I believe this would be
great pedagogy.
Today we know that relativity solved the issue of New-
ton’s non-locality and that experiments have confirmed
quantum non-locality beyond any reasonable doubts [34–
36].
Let’s now turn to the other similarity between
Bohmian mechanics and classical physics, that is the de-
terministic nature of Newton’s equations. For clocks,
harmonic oscillators and generally integrable dynamical
systems, the stability is such that the infinitesimal digits
of the initial condition do play no role. For chaotic sys-
tems, on the contrary, these infinitesimal digits quickly
dominate the dynamics. Hence, since these mathematical
infinitesimal digit do not physically exist13, chaotic dy-
namical system are not deterministic14. This fact doesn’t
change anything in practice (FAPP, as Bell would have
shouted [10]), but it demonstrates that classical Newto-
nian mechanics is simply not a deterministic physics the-
ory: despite the use of deterministic equations, it does
not describe deterministic physics [15].
There is, however, a huge difference between Newton’s
determinism (of the equations) and Bohmian or many-
worlds. In the former there is no entanglement. Hence,
one can separate the world into systems, hence “I” can
act on each of them individually. In an enormously en-
tangled world, on the contrary, there is no way to sepa-
rate sub-systems, there is no way to act on just one sub-
system. Determinism plus entanglement make things in-
13 Several colleagues complained that this ”physical existence” is
badly defined and/or confuses physical existence with measura-
bility. Let me try to clarify. Obviously real numbers can’t be
measured, neither today nor in any future. But my claim goes
way beyond that. The world out there is pretty well described by
today’s physics. Actually, it is also pretty well described by the
physics of one or two centuries ago, and will be even better de-
scribed by the physics in some centuries. But this doesn’t allow
us to identify the world out there with its physical description.
The world out there is infinitely richer than any physical descrip-
tion and than any human description. Somehow, the world out
there is ”‘free”’, i.e. it doesn’t let itself get trapped in our the-
ories, it does not depend on our description. In particular the
fact that we use real numbers doesn’t imply that real numbers
govern the world out there, nor does the fact that some of our
descriptions are based on deterministic equations imply that the
evolution of the world out there is deterministic. In brief, the
world out there can’t be confined (locked up) in any finite-time
physics theory.
14 One may argue that there is no quantum chaos. But this is not
entirely true, though quantum chaos differs deeply from classi-
cal chaos. In the quantum case it is the high sensitivity to the
exact Hamiltonian that should be considered. One may claim
that there is one exact fundamental Hamiltonian, thus no inde-
terminacy. But this is wrong, since, whatever units one chooses,
the Hamiltonian contains constants, like the masses of particles,
and these constants are described by real numbers. These real
numbers are themselves indetermined (random), hence even the
fundamental Hamiltonian leads to chaos.
tractable [37]. Accordingly, either “I” can not act, or “I”
do induce effective collapses that disentangle the subsys-
tems. But then, why not include these effective collapses
in the theory?
VI. DUALISM
In summary, so far we saw 4 sorts of attempts to cir-
cumvent the quantum measurement problem:
1. dualism as in orthodox Copenhagen quantum me-
chanics,
2. some configurations of atoms and photons make
them act as measurement setups that break super-
positions,
3. all possible results co-exist in some many-worlds,
4. all results were already encode in some additional
non-local variables, hidden for ever, as in Bohmian
mechanics.
Let me recall that since I consider the quantum mea-
surement problem as a real physics problem, it’s solution
will necessarily lead to new physics, including new and
testable predictions. It is a fact that so far attempts 2,
3 and 4 did not bring up as much good and new physics
as attempt 1 did. But I should add that this argument
might be a bit unfair, because attempt 1 came first and
had thus a significant advantage. Anyway, let’s consider
attempt number 1, i.e. dualism.
It is probably fair to say that most physicists would re-
ject dualism15. But could it be that they go too fast here?
Clearly, dividing the world out there into “small” and
“large” is not good enough. But couldn’t there be stuff
to which the superposition principle doesn’t apply? Some
have argued that the hypothetical non-quantum stuff is
space-time and/or gravity [38–42]. This is certainly a
possibility. But I am reluctant to put my bets on this, be-
cause everything is connected to space-time and to grav-
ity. Hence, if it is the coupling between the “quantum
stuff” and the hypothetical “non-quantum stuff” that
determines when a measurement happens, then, contin-
uously, everything always undergoes measurements. In
such a case, either the superposition principle is contin-
uously broken and one should never have seen superpo-
sitions, or the non-quantum stuff undergoes a bit of su-
perposition.
More formally, denoting |QS0〉 the initial state of some
quantum stuff that interacts with some non-quantum
15 By the way, many would even do so virulently, while at the same
time claiming to adhere to the Copenhagen interpretation, which
is dualist. The sames would simultaneously claim with joy how
proud they are to work in a field where rational thinking domi-
nates. Ok, I leave that line of thoughts to sociologists.
6stuff |NQS0〉, then, after an arbitrary short time the
quantum and non-quantum stuff get entangled:
|QS0〉|NQS0〉
t=ǫ
→
∑
j
|QSj〉|NQSj〉 (1)
But if the non-quantum stuff can’t at all be in superpo-
sition, then state (1) can’t exist, not even for a split of a
second. Hence, there would be instantaneously collapse
also for the quantum stuff.
People have speculated that this bit of superposition
gets quickly, though not instantaneously, washed out [38–
42]. Why not. But then, why introduce such a non-
quantum stuff in the first place? Why not merely assume
that all stuff undergo superpositions, but only in some
(precisely) limited way? Readers recognize here sponta-
neous collapse theories; more on this in section VII.
Before closing this section, let’s see whether there is
not another plausible way to divide the stuff into several
sorts, i.e. dualism16. There is obviously one that goes
back all the way to Descartes: “material stuff” and “non-
material stuff”. The superposition principle would apply
only to the material stuff. This is admittedly extremely
crude, certainly not yet a theory, not even a valid sketch
of a theory, because essentially nothing is said about the
“non-material stuff”. Moreover, one should not make
the situation more confused by thinking that the “non-
material stuff” is our “mind”, as this would imply that
the first measurement that ever happened had to wait
for us. However, I like to argue that one should also not
reject dualism too quickly. After all, it might well be
that there is stuff out there to which the superposition
principle does not apply.
Let’s return to the quantum measurement problem.
Although I am sort of a dualist from a philosophical point
of view17, I don’t think that dualism is the right solution
for the measurement problem. It might be that in some
decades, if the measurement problem remains without
significant progress, one may have to revisit a dualistic
solution, but at present we better stick to the assumption
that there is one and only one sort of stuff out there in the
real world and that the superposition principle applies to
it.
VII. MODIFIED SCHRO¨DINGER EQUATION
Recall that the superposition principle states, in words,
that if some stuff can be either in one state or in another,
16 Physics divides “me” and the outside world. I do not consider
this as fundamental dualism, but only as the scientific method.
Here I am asking whether a real physical dualism is a viable path
towards a resolution of the quantum measurement problem.
17 I don’t believe that everything is merely matter and energy as
described by today’s physics, not even stuff described by any
physics theory at any given point in time. Though I believe in
endless progress.
it can also be in the first state and in the second one,
i.e. in superposition of the two states. The linearity of
the Schro¨dinger equation implies then that such super-
position last for ever. Consequently, in a theory without
the measurement problem and in which everything (ex-
cept “I”) satisfy the superposition principle (and with-
out hyper-determinism) it must be the case that it is
the Schro¨dinger equation that has to be modified. First
attempts to modify the Schro¨dinger equation tried to ex-
tend it to some non-linear but still deterministic equation
[43–45]. But this turned out to be hopeless, as could be
expected from the discussions in the previous sections.
A quite convincing argument came from the observation
that any such deterministic nonlinear generalization of
the Schrodinger equation activates non-locality, i.e. pre-
dicts the possibility of arbitrarily fast communication [1–
3].
Hence, one has to go for a non-deterministic gener-
alization18. Non-deterministic merely means not deter-
ministic, that is it does not say how the equation should
be, it only says how the equation should not be. How-
ever, assuming that the evolution is Markovian and the
solution continuous in time, then - for those who know
stochastic differential equations - possibilities are quite
easy to find [1, 48–50]. Essentially there is only one [51].
This solution depends on some operators, a bit like the
Schro¨dinger equation depends on the Hamiltonian. At
this point, all that remains is to fix this operator of the
new, non-linear and stochastic term of the hypothetically
fundamental dynamical equation of the complemented
quantum theory and look for the new predictions.
Let’s be a bit more explicit. Consider the following Itoˆ
stochastic differential equation, see e.g. [48, 52]:
|dψt〉 = −iH |ψt〉dt
+
∑
j
(
2〈L†j〉ψtLj − L
†
jLj − 〈L
†
j〉ψt〈Lj〉ψt
)
|ψt〉dt
+
∑
j
(Lj − 〈Lj〉ψt) |ψt〉dξj (2)
where H is the usual Hamitonian, Lj ’s are (Lindblad lin-
ear) operators, 〈Lj〉ψt =
〈ψt|Lj|ψt〉
〈ψt|ψt〉
are the expectation
values of the operators Lj and the dξj ’s are independent
complex Wiener processes satisfying:
M [dξj ] = 0 (3)
M [dξjdξk] = 0 (4)
M [dξjdξ
∗
k ] = δjk dt (5)
where M [...] denotes the mean value. Note that eq. (2)
preserves the norm of |ψt〉.
18 Note that sticking to a linear equation is also hopeless, as the
Schrodinger equation is the only linear equation that preserves
the norm of the state vector, see also [46, 47]
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FIG. 1: Example of some solutions to eq. (2) in case of a
photon-number measurements, i.e. H = L = a†a. The initial
state is an equal superposition of odd photon-number states:
|1〉 + |3〉 + |5〉 + |7〉 + |9〉. The convergence to the eigenstates
can be clearly seen. Taken from [52].
Equation (2) describes a sort of Brownian motion in
Hilbert space of the state-vector |ψt〉. It is the analog of
a stochastic description of Browian motion at the indi-
vidual particle level. It is assumed that it is not merely
an approximation, but the foundamental dynamical law
describing how isolated quantum systems evolve. Hence
it predicts deviations from the standard Schro¨dinger dy-
namics, i.e. it predicts new physics. Consequently, at
least, such modified dynamical laws could be wrong!
To illustrate eq. (2) and for simplicity, let’s consider
the case with a single operator L, furthermore assume
it is self-adjoint and commutes with the Hamiltonian H .
Then, interestingly, the solutions to (2) follow a sort of
Brownian motion and eventually tends to an eigenstate
|l〉 of L. Moreover, the probability to tend to a given |l〉
equals the quantum probability |〈l|ψ0〉|
2, see Fig. 1.
When averaging over all solutions of (2), i.e. averag-
ing over all Wiener processes dξj , one obtains a density
matrix ρ(t) that satisfies the linear evolution equation:
dρ(t)
dt
= −i[H, ρ(t)] (6)
−
∑
j
(
L
†
jLjρ(t) + ρ(t)L
†
jLj − 2Ljρ(t)L
†
j
)
Equation (6) is the quantum analog of a classical Fokker-
Planck equation describing the probability distribution of
an ensemble of classical Browian particles.
Let us emphasize that since the density matrices at all
times follow a closed form equation, this modification of
the Schro¨dinger equation does not lead to the possibility
of faster than light communication [1, 48].
Remains to find what the operators Lj could be. Here
comes the beautiful finding of Ghirardi, Rimini and We-
ber [53]19. Assume the Lj are proportional to the posi-
tions of all elementary particles, with a proportionality
coefficient small enough that it barely affects the evolu-
tion of systems made out of one or only a few particles.
Hence, microscopic systems would essentially not be af-
fected by the modified Schro¨dinger equation (2). How-
ever, if a pointer is in superposition of pointing here and
pointing there, then, since the pointer is made out of an
enormous number of particles, let’s say about 1020, the
modified Schro¨dinger equation predicts a quasi instanta-
neous collapse: it suffices that a single particle gets lo-
calized by the stochastic nonlinear terms of equation (2)
for the entire pointer to localize, i.e. the pointer localizes
about 1020 times faster than individual particles.
I remain convinced that collapse models of the form
sketched above, see [56] and references there in, is the
best option we have today to solve the unacceptable
quantum measurement problem. Note, however, the fol-
lowing two critical points.
First, one unpleasant characteristic of such a modi-
fied dynamics is that the very same equation (2) can
also be derived within standard quantum theory by as-
suming some coupling between the quantum system and
its environment and conditioning the system’s state on
some continuous measurement outcomes carried out on
the environment [57]. This makes it highly non trivial
to demonstrate an evolution satisfying equation (2) as
a fundamental evolution, as one would have to convinc-
ingly show that the system does not interact significantly
with its environment. Note also that sufficient error cor-
rections could hide the additional stochastic terms of eq.
(2) and thus prevent that the developments of advanced
quantum information processors reveals them.
A second delicate point about eq. (2) is that it is not
relativistic and it seems impossible to make it relativistic
19 In 1988 Professor Alberto Rimini visited Geneva to present a
colloquium. He presented the famous GRW paper [53] in the
version Bell gave of it [54]. In the GRW theory, the non-linear
stochastic terms added to the Schro¨diger equation lead to solu-
tions with discontinuous jumps of the wave-packet, i.e. to some
sort of spontaneous collapses triggered by nothing but mere ran-
dom chance, as time passes. Near the end of his colloquium,
Rimini mentioned that an open question was to massage the
stochastic modifications in such a way that the solutions would
be continuous trajectories (in Hilbert space). He also emphasized
the need for an equation that would preserve (anti-)symmetric
states. He may have added that, with Philip Pearle [55], they
have a solution, but for sure he had no time to explain it. Im-
mediately after the colloquium I went to Alberto and told him
that I knew how to answer his questions. He encouraged me and
I immediately added a small section to a paper already quasi-
finished [1]. There is no doubt that Philip Pearle found CSL
independently. Lajos Diosi, by the way, did also find it [49].
Actually, everyone who, at that time, knew both GRW and Itoˆ
stochastic differential calculus would have found it, because it is
quite trivial, once you know the tools and the problem. Anyway,
Ghirardi and Pearle got very angry that I published my result
first and I decided to leave that field. I didn’t like fights and
wanted a carrier.
8[58].
The previous two points are part of the reasons I left
the field some 20 years ago.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I want to understand Nature. For me this requires
that “I” exist and that there is something out there to
be understood, in particular that there is a world out
there. Physics is all about extracting information about
How Nature Does It. For physicists extracting informa-
tion means performing measurements. Hence the mea-
surement problem has to be taken seriously. It is a real
physics problem and its solution will provide new physics
and new and testable predictions.
Taking standard Hilbert-space quantum theory at face
value, without the vague collapse postulate, leads to the
many-worlds: everything that can happen happens. The
problem, besides hyper-determinism, is that “I” am ex-
cluded from the many-worlds. In order to re-introduce
the “I”, one has to introduce some effective collapses that
happen when “I” interact with the world. Note that
this step is usually not taken explicitly by the many-
worlds followers, except when they compute predictions,
i.e. when they do physics. This is a bit similar to the well-
known Wigner friend story [59], though Wigner never
presented it in a many-worlds context. Hence, it seems
that in order to make physical sense of many-worlds, one
needs some form of dualism: “I” trigger effective col-
lapses. Before me, everything co-existed. Now that I
am here, in order to make predictions, I have to condi-
tion these “co-existing things”, on those that correlated
to me, using some effective collapses. Since it is a fact
that “I” exist, wouldn’t it be much simpler and cleaner
to assume that the effective collapses are truly real and
to include them in our physics theory?
Bohmian mechanics is a nice and constructive exis-
tence proof of non-local hidden variables. But it suf-
fers from similar drawbacks than the many-worlds. It is
hyper-deterministic and in order to make predictions one
has to introduce an “I” that does some conditioning by
de facto effective collapses. Hence, again, it is cleaner to
assume real collapses in our physics theory. Moreover,
doing so we may at least be wrong, i.e. at least we may
predict new phenomena.
Remains the question of what triggers the collapses.
Should we formulate the measurement problem as a
search for those configurations of atoms and photons that
trigger a collapse, as formulated in section I? This is an
interesting line of experimental research.
Dualism is a very natural position in our culture. Ac-
tually, I don’t see how to avoid it for our Science to make
sense. But I believe much premature to jump to the
conclusion that it is the interaction between “I” and the
outside world that triggers the collapses of the quantum
states. Other forms of dualism, actually trialism: “I”
plus two sorts of stuff out there, are logical possibilities,
but there are no good candidates and introducing some
new stuff seems too high a price to pay, especially when
it is not (yet?) needed.
Remains spontaneous collapses, described for instance
by some modified Scho¨dinger equation to which one adds
some non-linear stochastic terms, as in eq. (2). These ad-
ditional terms lead continuously and spontaneously, i.e.
by mere random chance, to collapses that barely affect
microscopic systems, but quickly localize macroscopic ob-
jects. It seems to me that the scientific method that has
been that efficient so far tells us that this spontaneous
collapse approach is by far the most promising one. For
me, it is also the only one that is consistent with what I
expect from physics. Indeed, at the end of the day, a the-
ory without collapses, doesn’t predict any events, hence
has zero explanatory power.
One additional value of collapse theories is that they
naturally incorporate the passage of time. I am well
aware that it is fashion in physics to claim that time is
an illusion [60]. Admittedly, time is a complex notion, or
series of notions with many facets, time may be relative,
difficult to grasp, etc. But time exists. Moreover, time
passes [15, 17, 18].
With spontaneous collapse theories, time exists and
passes, the world out there exists and undergoes a
stochastic evolution. And “I” exist, outside the theory,
able to contemplate it, to develop it and act as an ob-
server.
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